In this paper a protection placement problem for power network measurement system data integrity is considered. The placement problem is motivated from the data secure power network design applications in [Dan and Sandberg 2010]. The problem is shown to be NP-hard and an integer linear programming formulation is provided based on the topological observability condition by [Krumpholz, Clements and Davis 1980] . The incorporation of the observability condition requires a graph connectivity constraint which is found to be most effectively described by the Miller-Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) conditions. For a specialization without line power flow measurements, the protection placement problem can be modeled by a domination type integer linear program much easier to solve than the general formulation requiring graph connectivity. Numerical studies with IEEE benchmark and other large power systems with more than 2000 buses indicate that using the proposed formulations, the protection placement problem can be solved in negligible amount of time in realistic application settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation is a crucial functionality in energy management system. Data integrity of state estimation is of paramount importance to other downstream functionalities including optimal power flow, unit commitment and contingency analysis. Customarily bad data detection (BDD) is employed in conjunction with state estimation to detect and isolate possible data anomalies and to rectify the data if possible. In traditional BDD, however, data anomalies are typically treated as random measurement error or switch status error. This assumption on anomalies significantly limits the energy management system's capabilities to combat malicious data attack on state estimation. For example, references [1] - [5] analyze and quantify the consequence of a type of malicious data attack called false data injection attack [1] . Another important data integrity research direction, which is the focus of this paper, is protection placement. A typical placement objective is to seek a minimum cost placement of protection resources (e.g., encryption devices, secure phasor measurement units (PMU)) so that, according to the considered attack and defense model, no false data injection attack is possible (e.g., [2] , [4] , [6] ). Because of the combinatorial feature, it is often deemed acceptable to only sub-optimally solve the protection placement The author is with the Department of Electrical Engineering at National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan. sou12@mail.nsysu.edu.tw. This work is supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of Taiwan through the project: Application of graph decomposition theory in the optimal analysis and planning of large-scale smart electricity grids, MOST 106-2218-E-110-004-MY3. problem. For example, [2] , [4] , [6] consider various types of heuristic algorithms aiming to minimize the protection cost. The protection placement problem is closely related to the classical problem of observable measurement system design in power systems (e.g., [7] - [11] ). Leveraging the connection between the protection placement problem and observable measurement system design problem, this paper seeks to solve the former problem exactly via integer programming with the help of the results from the later problem (e.g., [7] , [12] ). Unifying the results in [7] , [12] , this paper formulates a protection placement optimization problem suitable for applications with bus power injection, line power flow as well as PMU measurements. It is shown that the optimization problem is NP-hard and an integer program formulation of the problem is provided. A crucial consideration in the formulation is the modeling of a graph connectivity requirement due to [12] , which significantly affects the computation effort required to solve the formulation. After extensive investigations it is concluded that the Miller-Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) conditions [13] are best for the purpose herein. The numerical studies in this paper demonstrate that even for models with more than 2000 buses the MTZ based formulation can be solved, on average, within a few minutes on a PC. This is acceptable for power system planning purposes. In addition, for a restricted setup without line power flow measurements (e.g., only PMUs and zero injection buses as in [7] ) it is established that a streamlined integer linear programming formulation originally appears in [7] is indeed correct for the protection placement problem (as well as the problem in [7] ). To the best of our knowledge, the proof of correctness of the formulation from [7] appears for the first time in this paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A power network is modeled as an undirected connected graph where the nodes are buses, and the edges are transmission (distribution) lines. The set of all buses (nodes) is denoted V and the set of lines (edges) is denoted E. An edge is defined by an unordered pair {i, j} where i, j ∈ V are the two end nodes of the edge. The power network graph is denoted (V, E). The symbols |V | and |E| denote the number of buses and the number of lines, respectively. Following [2] , [4] - [6] , this paper considers the DC power flow measurement model [14] for state estimation. In this model, the states to be estimated are the bus voltage phasors. The measurements include bus real power injections, line real power flows and phasors measured directly from relevant PMUs. In this paper, a PMU measures the phasor at the installed bus as well as those at all neighboring buses. Let z and θ denote the vectors of measurements and states respectively. Then, DC power flow model specifies z = Hθ + Δz, where H is the measurement matrix and Δz denotes measurement imperfection. In this paper, Δz is the vector of data attacks on measurements.
In state estimation, BDD attempts to detect possible data attack in the measurements (i.e., Δz). In a typical residual-based BDD scheme, the measurement residual r and the data attack Δz are related by r =
where R is a given diagonal positive definite matrix. The relation specifies that r is the projection of Δz on the left null space of H. In other words, if Δz = Hθ for someθ then r = 0, resulting in detection evasion. Malicious attack of this form is referred to as false data injection attack [1] . As a countermeasure, [2] , [4] - [6] consider the notion of perfect protection where selected measurements or PMUs are protected to prevent false data injection attacks. The protection rule is as follows: injection and line power flow measurements can be protected individually: protecting measurement z i means Δz i = 0. However, protection rule for PMU is different: suppose a PMU is associated with measurements z j with j ∈ J for some row index set of H. Protecting the PMU means Δz j = 0 for all j ∈ J . Arranging the protected measurements first, a false data injection attack is of the form
where H p and Hp are the submatrices of H corresponding to the protected and unprotected measurements respectively. In (1) H pθ = 0 is due to protection directly. To ensure perfect protection (i.e., Δz = 0), it is required that for anyθ, H pθ = 0 =⇒ Δzp = Hpθ = 0.
Condition (2) is equivalent to the fact that the null space of H p is a subspace of the null space of Hp. However, neither this condition or (2) is convenient to impose in an optimization problem (for protection placement). Furthermore, a perfect protection condition dependent on the unprotected measurements (i.e., Hp) is undesirable because the constitution of the unprotected measurements may change during operations. This might result in loss of perfect protection. Consequently, in references including [4] , [6] the following sufficient condition for perfect protection is considered H pθ = 0 =⇒θ = 0, i.e., H p has full column rank. (3) Condition (3) is algebraic observability condition [12] for the reduced measurement system utilizing only the protected measurements characterized by (the rows of) H p . However, the algebraic observability condition is sensitive to the values of line impedance parameters. Thus, instead of (3) this paper considers the topological observability condition [12] to guarantee perfect protection. Generically, matrix H p in (3) is
where A ∈ R |V |×|E| is the (signed) incidence matrix describing the topology of the power network. The directions of the directed arcs in A are designated arbitrarily. Matrix D ∈ R |E| 2 is diagonal with nonzero entries being the reciprocals of the line reactances. M I , M L and M P are submatrices containing rows of identity matrices of appropriate dimensions, in order to select the protected measurements for injection, line power flows and PMU respectively. Then, condition (3) amounts to H p in (4) having full column rank, for a specific D. On the other hand, the topological observability condition considered in this paper requires that
for almost all diagonalD. (5) Condition (5) depends on the topology of the power system graph (V, E) and the locations of the protected measurements. However, it is independent of line parameters. Additionally, it can be shown that (5) is equivalent to a graph connectivity condition specified by the following statement:
sets of protected injections, line power flows and PMU phasors respectively). Define the following objects:
• M I is a submatrix of a |V | × |V | identity matrix containing the rows corresponding to I. • M L is a submatrix of a |E| × |E| identity matrix containing the rows corresponding to L. • M P is a submatrix of a |V | × |V | identity matrix containing the rows corresponding to P .
Then, condition (5) holds if and only if there exists a function g :
Proof: The proof can be found in [15] . Note that since A T 1 = 0 and node 0 can only be connected through E P 0 , the two equivalent conditions established in Proposition 2.1 both requires P = ∅ (i.e., at least one protected PMU). However, Proposition 2.1 does not assume connectivity of the original power network graph (V, E), though connectivity typically holds in practice. In the situation without PMU, condition (3) should be modified so that the null space of H p is the span of 1. The topological observability condition in [12] can be utilized directly to describe the modified condition without Proposition 2.1.
The protection placement problem in this paper seeks a minimum cost protection placement to guarantee perfect protection in the sense of (5). The protection decisions are described by 0-1 binary decision variables x i for i ∈ V , y j for j ∈ E and z k for k ∈ V for bus power injections, line power flows and PMU respectively. By convention, x i = 1 if and only if the injection at bus i is protected. Analogous conventions apply to the y j and z k decision variables. In addition, let M I ⊆ V , M L ⊆ E and M P ⊆ V denote the set of buses with measured injections, the set of lines with measured power flows and the set of buses with PMU installed, respectively. Then, by convention
Let c I i , c L j and c P k denote the protection costs associated with x i , y j and z k respectively. If bus v is a zero-injection bus the corresponding protection cost is c I v = 0. Then, the objective of the protection placement problem is to minimize
Let
the set of buses with power injection measurement protected, the set of lines with power flow measurement protected and the set of buses whose phasors are measured by protected PMU respectively. Recall
Then, by Proposition 2.1 the perfect protection constraint is
In sequel, (6) and (7) together are referred to as the perfect protection problem. The perfect protection problem is NPhard. This can be established by considering the special case with a PMU at each bus but nothing else (i.e., M I = ∅, M L = ∅, M P = V ). This special case reduces to a minimum dominating set problem which is NP-hard (e.g., [16] ).
III. INTEGER PROGRAMMING FORMULATION OF PERFECT

PROTECTION PROBLEM
To model (6) and (7) as an integer program it is necessary to describe the connectivity requirement in (7) as linear constraints with respect to the decision variables. Intuitively, (7) is equivalent to the existence of a rooted spanning tree using edges in L(y)∪E P 0 (z)∪g(I(x))). First, for an arbitrary graph (V ,Ē) the conditions for existence of a rooted spanning tree are described. Second, additional requirements are described specifying that the spanning tree can be formed using only edges in L(y) ∪ E P 0 (z) ∪ g (I(x) ), making the spanning tree conditions relevant to (7) .
For existence of spanning tree well-known conditions include, for example, Miller-Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) conditions [17] , subtour elimination (e.g., [18] ), Martin's conditions [19] , single commodity flow (e.g., [20] , [21] ) and multi-commodity flow (e.g., [22] ). After computation studies conducted in conjunction with this work (not shown in this paper), a variant of MTZ conditions [13] is adopted. The detail is as follows. Let (V ,Ē) be given andV includes some "reference" node 0. LetĀ be the bi-directed version ofĒ (i.e.,Ā := {(i, j), (j, i) | {i, j} ∈Ē}). Let f ij ∈ {0, 1} for (i, j) ∈Ā be 0-1 binary decision variables (to describe the spanning tree). In addition, define integer decision variables u i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |V | − 1} for i ∈V . Then, according to [13] the graph (V ,Ē) contains a (directed) spanning tree if and only if there admits f and u satisfying the following constraints
The directed spanning tree, if exists, is characterized by f (i.e., f ij = 1 if and only if arc (i, j), from i to j, is included). The constraints (8a) to (8e) impose restrictions in the choice of f (and u). Constraints (8a) and (8b) together are referred to as subtour elimination constraints. They prevent directed cycles with less than |V | arcs. Constraint (8c) specifies that for each node other than 0 exactly one outgoing arc is included in f . Constraint (8d) specifies that for node 0 at least one incoming arc is included in f . Node 0 is the in-root of the spanning tree. Constraint (8e) requires that f contains |V | arcs. It can be verified that f corresponding to any directed spanning tree rooted at node 0 satisfies all constraints in (8a) to (8e), with some appropriate choice of u. Conversely, f (together with u) satisfying constraints (8a) to (8d) means that from each node other than node 0 there exists a directed path to node 0. Hence, f characterizes a connected graph containing all nodes. Constraint (8e) states that the connected graph contains exactly |V | − 1 arcs which implies that it is a tree (cf. [23] ). In conclusion, constraints (8a) to (8e) are necessary and sufficient for existence of (directed) spanning tree in (V ,Ē) (or equivalently the connectedness of (V ,Ē)). Next, we specialize conditions (8a) to (8e) toV = V ∪ {0} andĒ = E ∪ {{i, 0} | i ∈ V }. In addition, we impose the conditions that f ij is enabled (i.e., allowed to be one) if and only if {i, j} ∈ L(y) ∪ E P 0 (z) ∪ g(I(x)) for some function g in (7) . An edge of the form {i, 0} for i ∈ V can only be enabled by E P 0 (z). Recall that PMU at bus i is protected if and only if z i = 1. Therefore,
On the other hand, an edge e ∈ E is enabled either because e ∈ L(y) (i.e., protected line) or e ∈ g(I(x)) (i.e., assignment from protected injection):
where w ei for e ∈ E, i ∈ V are 0-1 binary decision variables describing the assignment g(I(x)) in (7) . The convention is that w ei = 1 if and only if g(i) = e. Because of the fact that g is a function, as well as other requirements in (7) , additional constraints should be imposed on w:
This concludes modeling (7) as linear constraints. The integer program describing the perfect protection problem is summarized as minimize x,y,z,w,f,u cost in (6) subject to constraints (8a) to (11)
IV. DOMINATION SPECIALIZATION OF PERFECT
PROTECTION PROBLEM
While (12) describes the perfect protection problem in general, more streamlined (hence less computationally demanding) formulations are available if restrictions are imposed on the available measurement types (characterized by M I , M L and M P ). An example described earlier is that M I = ∅, M L = ∅ and M P = V . In this case, problem (12) is a minimum dominating set problem which requires fewer constraints to model and less time to solve. It turns out a more general case with M L = ∅ also admits streamlined formulation as a domination-type problem without requiring graph connectivity. This is specified by the following statement Proposition 4.1: Let graph (V, E) be given with V = {v 1 , . . . , v |V | }. Let I ⊆ V and P ⊆ V be given (i.e., set of protected injections and set of phasors associated with protected PMUs, respectively). Consider the following two conditions:
(a) there exists g : I → E such that i ∈ g(i) and the graph Proof: The proof can be found in [15] . Since it is impossible to satisfy (a) in Proposition 4.1 if P = ∅, the perfect protection problem can be augmented with the constraint P = ∅. In addition, assume that (V, E) is connected (connectivity can be checked in polynomial time). Then, conditions (a) and (b) in Proposition 4.1 are equivalent. Thus, (b) provides an alternative formulation of the perfect protect problem in the case with no line power flows (i.e., M L = ∅). The protection decisions are encoded by 0-1 binary variables x and z, for injections and PMUs respectively, as in (6) and (7) . The sets I(x) and P (z) are defined similarly. In condition (b), I = I(x) and P = P (z). To describe function h, define 0-1 binary decision variables w ij for i, j ∈ V such that w ij = 1 if and only if h(j) = i. The conditions P (z) ∪ h(I(x)) = V and h(i) = i or {i, h(i)} ∈ E require
as well as
While constraint P = ∅ is a natural consequence of (a) in Proposition 4.1 (i.e., (7) ), it needs to be explicitly imposed while formulating with (b) in Proposition 4.1:
Then, the following integer program is equivalent to problem (6) and (7) when M P = ∅ and (V, E) is connected:
subject to constraints (13), (14) and (15) x
(16) Constraint (13) requires that each node is dominated by at least a protected PMU or a protected injection (subject to assignment rule), motivating the term "domination" for problem (16) . Empirically, the graph connectivity requirement in (12) is much more difficult to handle than the domination requirement in (16) . The difference in computation performances will be demonstrated in Section V. In [7] problem (16) is used to model a PMU placement problem equivalent to (6) and (7) . However, no proof is provided in [7] to justify the use. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in the literature to establish that (16) indeed models the perfect protection problem (as well as the one in [7] ), under the relevant assumptions discussed earlier.
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
To illustrate the perfect protection layout and the computation experience with the proposed formulations, instances of problems (12) and (16) are solved in this section. All optimization problems are solved using Gurobi called in MATLAB and the computations are performed on a PC with 14 CPU cores at 2GHz (base frequency) with 128GB of RAM. The power network graphs describing the instances are from the IEEE power system benchmark database [24] . First the IEEE 9-bus system is considered. In this example, all bus injections, line power flows and the PMUs at all buses are eligible for protection. The protection costs for all injections and line flows are one except at the three zero-injection buses (i.e., 4, 6, 8) the injection protection cost is zero. On the other hand, the PMU protection cost is one for all buses. The protection costs are specified so that at optimality only the injections at the three zero-injection buses and the PMUs would be candidates for protection. Because of Proposition 4.1 and the choice of protection costs, the perfect protection problem in this example is equivalent to the minimum cost PMU placement problem in [7] . Two formulations in (12) and (16) are solved for the perfect protection problem in this example. Note that (16) is applicable since the line power flows will never be protected at optimality. Both cases lead to the same result: protecting the PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 with the total protection cost being two. This is the same cost for the same example in [7] , though the result therein is to "protect" the PMUs at bus 5 and bus 8. It can be verified that, with identityD, matrix H p (D) in (5) has full column rank with protected PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 (with three zero-injection buses at 4, 6 and 8). Fig. 1 shows the optimal protection layout and verifies that constraint (7) (i.e., the only constraint of perfect protection problem) is satisfied. Fig. 2 shows how condition (b) in Proposition 4.1 is satisfied Fig. 1 : Minimum cost perfect protection layout of the IEEE 9 bus example, in which the PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 are protected. The result is obtained by solving problem (12) . In the figure, the two dash blue boxes indicate the "zones" covered by the protected PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 respectively. The two zones enable direct connections to the "reference" bus 0 through the thick red lines for buses 1, 4, 5, 9, 6, 7 and 8. In addition, buses 4, 6 and 8 are zero-injection buses whose injections are known to be zero (i.e., protected automatically). The injections help to satisfy (7) by enabling additional red lines indicated by the arrows.
by the optimal protection layout due to solving (16) .
The remaining study is divided into two parts referred to as (i) the full measurement case and (ii) the no line power flow case pertaining Section III and Section IV respectively. In the full measurement case, all bus injections and line power flows are measured. In addition, each bus is equipped with a PMU and 10% of the buses are zero-injection buses. That is, (16) . In the figure, the blue and red dash boxes indicate the "zones" dominated by protected PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 respectively, in the sense that the buses in the zones are in set P as in (b) of Proposition 4.1. In addition, the two zero-injection buses can be "assigned" through function h in (b) of Proposition 4.1 to dominate the two buses not in any zone (i.e., buses 2 and 3).
the full measurement case, for each power system in database [24] , 100 instances of the general perfect protection problem are generated and the corresponding integer programs in (12) are solved. In addition, the protection layouts are verified to provide perfect protection as specified by (5), for some randomly chosenD. For each power system, the average computation time (over 100 samples) for solving (12) is shown in Table I shows the protection placement of an instance of (12) . It is shown that the the perfect protection constraint in (7) is satisfied with an appropriate assignment. For the no line power flow case 100 random instances of the perfect protection problems are generated for each power system, and these instances are solved as the corresponding domination formulations in (16) . Also, the general formulation in (12) is solved for comparison. For all instances, the two formulations result in the same (optimal) protection cost. The average computation times (over 100 samples) for instances of various numbers of buses are shown in Fig. 4 . The results indicate that the domination formulations in (16) (applicable only without line power flow) require only a fraction of time required by the general formulation in (12) . 
VI. CONCLUSION
Extending the result in [12] , it is possible to model as integer program with graph connectivity constraints the perfect protection (or observable measurement placement) problem including power injections, line power flows as well as PMUs. The MTZ constraints modeling graph connectivity are found to be superior for computation efficiency. Even for instances with more than 2000 buses optimal placement can be found within a few minutes on a PC. This agrees with the computation findings in [22] for variants of the dominating set problem. For the case without line power flow measurements the perfect protection problem can be reduced into a domination type integer program, which further improves computation efficiency. As a byproduct, the result in this paper proves the correctness of the formulation in [7] . For future studies, extension of the results in this paper to general N − k contingency cases could open up more application opportunities in the future.
